The first thing that must be stated clearly is that Syria’s problem is not just the name of the ruler, but the very structure of power itself. After the fall of Bashar al-Assad, Ahmed al-Sharaa became interim president in January 2025, and then the Constitutional Declaration was issued in March 2025, establishing a five-year transitional period with broad presidential powers, while legislative authority was entrusted to a transitional People’s Assembly until a permanent constitution was adopted and legislative elections were held. This means that the real danger is not just “who occupies the chair,” but that the chair itself remains designed in the old Arab style: a president above the institutions, not a president within the institutions.
The idea that many have overlooked is this: the Arab revolutions repeatedly failed because they toppled the tyrant but not the logic of tyranny. In other words, they demolished the facade but left the psychological and political architecture intact: loyalty before competence, kinship before merit, symbolism before accountability, and slogans before construction. Here, the new ruler becomes merely an updated version of the old disease, even if he comes with a different slogan, different attire, or different religious rhetoric. This is not simply a matter of a "bad person," but rather a matter of a system that punishes independence and rewards obedience. And despotism in the Arab world often returns through the very door the revolution entered: the door of "temporary exception," "a sensitive phase," and "let's not open the door to disagreement now." Then the transition becomes permanent, and the temporary becomes the governing doctrine.
Hence the fundamental critique of the Sharia, not merely as an individual, but as a center of power around which the state is being reshaped. If the transitional phase has effectively begun with a formula granting the president a broad role in shaping the new system, the question is not: Do we trust him? Rather: Why build a system that depends on trust in a man, instead of one that requires institutional discipline? A sound state is not built on the righteousness of the ruler, but on the limitations of his powers. A good man may pass away, he may fall ill, he may become corrupt, he may weaken, and he may be betrayed by those around him. A good institution, however, is what prevents even a good man from becoming a danger. This is the difference between a state and a leader.
Therefore, any serious discussion about Syria must begin with a clear demand: reducing the powers of the transitional presidency, expediting the formation of a genuinely independent legislative authority, and establishing a clear and publicly announced timetable for elections—not vague pronouncements open to extension and interpretation. The current constitutional declaration stipulates a relatively long transitional period and a People's Assembly to temporarily exercise legislative power, but the core of the legitimate political objection is that a prolonged transition with a strong presidency could reproduce the same logic of centralized control, even if the language is different.
The idea that Syria should be governed by a "sheikh" mentality, with bearded men exercising guardianship over people's private lives, is not merely a matter of individual freedoms; it is a matter of a civilizational failure to understand the meaning of the modern state. The modern state does not ask its citizens how to dress, how to practice their religion, or how to reconcile their conscience with God. That is not its function. The state's function is security, justice, property, health, education, infrastructure, and the protection of freedoms within the framework of the law. When preachers infiltrate the structure of power, or when personal morality becomes a political issue, the state begins to disintegrate from within. Because then you are no longer dealing with a public administration, but rather with a moral filtering apparatus that judges people based on appearances, not actions. This is the natural gateway to widespread hypocrisy: everyone feigns virtue, while the state itself is eroding.
Syria has paid a terrible price for nearly a century of coups, party dominance, militarization, Ba'athist rule, and the rule of Hafez al-Assad, father and son. After independence in 1946, the country never settled into a healthy constitutional life. Instead, it quickly descended into a period of military coups in 1949, followed by periods of unity and secession, and conflict between the army and political parties, until the Ba'ath Party seized power in 1963. From 1970 onward, Hafez al-Assad established a security state model embodied in the leader, emptying institutions of their meaning and transforming the army, security forces, and the party into instruments of social control rather than servants of the state. Bashar al-Assad inherited this structure after 2000, and with the 2011 uprising, Syria entered a long and devastating war that ended with his downfall in December 2024 and the rise of the current transitional authority led by Ahmed al-Sharaa. This background is crucial because the most dangerous thing Syria could do today is to move from the cult of personality surrounding Assad to the cult of personality surrounding another version of the political figure.
Here, invoking Winston Churchill becomes a very apt example. Churchill led Britain in World War II and was a true national icon, yet he lost the 1945 election to the Labour Party. The British people didn't say, "He's a war hero, therefore he's above reproach." Instead, they essentially said, "You've played your part in history, and now we want a different order for peacetime and social development." The Labour Party won a resounding majority, 393 seats to the Conservatives' 197. The lesson here is brutal and clear: healthy nations thank their leaders, but they don't grant them perpetual power. Heroism doesn't give them a blank check to rule. Even the man who saved his country from disaster can become unsuitable for the next stage.
Other examples from history can be added: Charles de Gaulle led Free France and later returned under a different constitutional framework, but resigned when he lost the referendum in 1969; George Washington could have established himself as a symbol above the republic, but he voluntarily relinquished power, setting a precedent for its peaceful transfer; Nelson Mandela possessed immense moral legitimacy, but he did not transform it into a permanent right to remain in power. Political greatness is measured not only by what a person achieves, but also by what they refrain from acquiring. These are generally accepted historical examples.
The deeper point here is that personal loyalty is the slow poison of any nation emerging from war. When you appoint an official because they are “loyal to the president,” not because they are capable of managing a ministry, a province, or a security or economic portfolio, you are not building a nation; you are building a protective network around the ruler. These networks may seem effective at first, but they quickly breed corruption, cronyism, and fear of independent talent, and then begin to eliminate anyone who doesn't fall in line. Thus, the state is transformed into a vast fiefdom, not a republican institution.
Therefore, the concept of meritocracy is not a Western luxury, but a prerequisite for Syria's survival. The Syria of the future cannot be governed by the logic of "he's one of us," nor by the logic of "he has a history of fighting," nor by the logic of "he's related to so-and-so," or "he's so-and-so's son-in-law," or "he's so-and-so's brother-in-law." A state emerging from devastation needs the exact opposite: expertise, management, the rule of law, oversight, transparency, separation of powers, and accountability. In the reconstruction phase, appointing an incompetent official becomes a political crime, because the price is paid not only from the treasury, but also from the lives of the people.
Even more dangerous is that when religious discourse becomes intertwined with power, it corrupts both: it corrupts religion by transforming it into a tool of control, and it corrupts the state by turning it into a reflection of the whims of the most powerful religious figure, rather than the principle of citizenship. Syria is not a religious lodge, nor a preaching emirate, nor a morality police force. Syria is a diverse country: Arabs, Kurds, Sunnis, Alawites, Druze, Christians, Ismailis, secularists, religious people, tribes, cities, rural areas, displaced persons, and returnees. This complex entity cannot be governed by the mentality of a sheikh who believes that people are a moral herd to be controlled. This is not only backward, but political suicide. Because after all this bloodshed, Syrian society will not easily accept a transition from security-based oppression to moral oppression.
Therefore, serious criticism of the regime must be on this level: not simply that “it’s bad” or “it’s a copy of others,” but rather: if it doesn’t set limits on its own power, it will have reproduced the Syrian problem instead of solving it. And if it doesn’t announce a clear electoral timetable, accept respectable international monitoring, allow for a truly representative national council, and abandon the logic of personal appointments, then any talk of liberation will be incomplete. True liberation is not just about overthrowing the old regime, but about dismantling the notion that Syria needs a new father figure every time.
Received by email from a friend, I don't know who the author is nor his name, but it is indeed a good analysis of the Syrian present situation and some remedies for the political situation, what makes it even more interesting is the fact that it could be addressed to many actual governing entities throughout the world, more so in some supposedly old and established democracies. It is a universal study and analysis indeed, that is worth reading carefully and applied all over or modern political times.
As always, all my thanks to all.
