The negotiations are progressing beyond simply establishing a ceasefire or managing calm in the south of Lebanon. Washington announced a fourth round of negotiations on June 2 and 3, in parallel with the launch of a security track at the Pentagon on May 29, with the participation of military delegations from both sides, in a move that reflects the shift in the discussion from the framework of field calm to an attempt to formulate long-term security and political arrangements.
The ongoing negotiations are divided into two main tracks: the first is military, relating to a ceasefire and Israeli withdrawal. The first track focuses on reconstruction, while the second revolves around the issue of the state's monopoly on weapons and sustainable security arrangements on the borders. Between these two tracks, concerns are growing that the proposed security gradual approach could become a pretext for redrawing internal power balances. Amid growing questions about the army's position and the future of Hezbollah weapons, That limits of the American role in reshaping the landscape.
The outcome of the negotiations. Washington On May 29, Brigadier General Dr. Bahaa Hilal explained that the region is not facing a mere ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanon, rather, it's facing an American attempt to reshape the Lebanese security and political structure within a new regional system, in which the definitions of security, sovereignty, the function of the state, and the role of weapons outside its official institutions are being redefined.
The information circulating about the security track indicates a multi-stage project starting from southern Lebanon, specifically south of the Litany River, under the title of consolidating the truce and preventing the return of the military front against Israel. But a deeper reading, according to Gen. Hilal, reveals that the objective goes far beyond that, gradually aiming to reshape the entire Lebanese security environment.
This begins with bolstering the army's deployment, establishing monitoring and coordination mechanisms under American auspices, linking reconstruction and financial support to security measures, and extending to the issue of Hezbollah's weapons north of the Litany River, then in the southern suburbs and Beirut. It is precisely here that the similarity to the May 17, 1983 agreement begins, not necessarily in its direct legal form, but rather in the underlying political and security philosophy of the project.
In both cases, the following emerges, As Brigadier General Hilal states, the US acts as the sponsor, guarantor, and supervisor of the re-establishment of a new security balance, one in which the security of Israel and its northern borders holds absolute priority. The core of the current American proposal rests on the idea of gradually transforming the Lebanese state into a security partner in controlling the resistance and its weapons. This echoes the philosophy underlying the May 17 Agreement, which linked Lebanese stability to security arrangements connected to Israel.
However, the fundamental difference between the periods of 1983 and 2026 lies in the shifting balance of power. In the 1980s, Israel occupied Lebanon. Large parts of Lebanon were under Israeli control, and the Lebanese state was virtually collapsed as the civil war raged. Today, the situation is far more complex. Israel has not achieved a decisive strategic victory, and Hezbollah, despite the strikes, still possesses significant military and organizational capabilities and a broad network of influence. Furthermore, the Shia community continues to view weapons as a means of protection and deterrence against Israel.
Therefore, the American strategy and approach appears to be closer to a long-term, gradual containment project, rather than imposing a direct or rapid surrender. Hence, according to Brigadier General Hilal, the talk is of a step-by-step approach: Lebanese security measures in exchange for de-escalation, economic support, reconstruction, and political and international guarantees.
In this sense, the security track is not a final agreement, but rather a cumulative process aimed at shifting the issue of weapons from a position of independent power to one of negotiation and restriction. However, the most dangerous aspect of the proposed project, according to Brigadier General Hilal, does not only concern Hezbollah's weapons, but also the Lebanese military institution itself. The United States appears to be betting on the Lebanese army as the only legitimate instrument capable of implementing any future security arrangements. Therefore, the increasing American support for the army cannot be understood apart from the attempt to redefine its role in the coming phase. This highlights the delicate position of General Rudolph Haykal, the army commander, who finds himself facing one of the most complex dilemmas in the history of the Lebanese military: how to maintain relations with the international community and external support, while simultaneously preventing the army from sliding into an internal confrontation with the broader Lebanese public?
Historically, as Brigadier General Hilal emphasizes, the army was not built as an instrument of civil conflict, but rather as a national balancing force whose goal is to protect stability, prevent disintegration, and maintain a minimum level of national unity. Therefore, the most dangerous aspect of the current American proposal is not merely the idea of disarmament, but the possibility of gradually drawing the army into an internal political and sectarian conflict under the guise of the state's monopoly on the use of force.
In this context, any talk, as Brigadier General Hilal says, of joint brigades or security arrangements directly linked to the American-Israeli vision will place the military establishment before a highly sensitive existential test. The move from south of the Litany River to its north, and then to the southern suburbs of Beirut, is not merely a geographical shift, but a move into the heart of the social and political environment that fosters the resistance.
It is precisely here, as Hilal says, that the comparison with the experience of Saad Haddad and Antoine Lahad becomes strongly present in the Lebanese consciousness. While it is true that the circumstances are radically different, and that the discussion today does not revolve around a separate local militia like the South Lebanon Army, the similarity lies in the same security philosophy: the creation of a Lebanese structure functionally linked to Israeli security under the guise of protecting the borders and controlling the resistance. However, the difference is that the current project does not attempt to build a "militia" parallel to the state, but rather seeks to utilize the state's own institutions, foremost among them the army, within a new regional security system that enjoys international and American backing.
Thus, the greatest Lebanese fear, as Brigadier General Hilal states, lies not only in the issue of normalization or negotiation, but also in the possibility that the division over the issue of weapons could transform into an internal rift threatening the very unity of the state. A swift or forced move toward an internal confrontation with Hezbollah could destabilize the military establishment, exacerbate sectarian tensions, and unravel Lebanon's fragile balances.
For this reason, Washington appears, thus far, to be steering matters gently, avoiding a full-blown explosion, because while a Lebanese civil war might achieve Israel's goal of weakening the resistance and depleting its support base, it could simultaneously open the door to regional chaos that would be difficult to control.
This is precisely the question that will determine whether Lebanon is facing a new historical settlement or a more complex and updated version of the May 17th crisis and the civil war combined. Given this, Brigadier General Hilal believes that a step-by-step approach is the most realistic, as it is the practical model currently being proposed: a security measure in exchange for reduced attacks, aid, reconstruction, international support, and political guarantees. For example: removing weapons from south of the Litany River in exchange for de-escalation; strengthening the army in exchange for aid and armaments; monitoring border crossings in exchange for easing economic pressure; and discussing heavy weapons in exchange for political stability and reconstruction. This aligns with the American discourse advocating a gradual approach rather than an immediate resolution.